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IV

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ROY LEE GLASPER,
Petitioner/Appellant,
v.

Case No. 20000481 -CA
:
Priority No. 3

STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Petitioner appeals the district court's dismissal of his petition for postconviction relief challenging his convictions for burglary, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-202 (1995), and theft, a third degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-404 (1995). This Court has jurisdiction
under Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(f) (1996).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue I: Should petitioner's claims be dismissed because they are inadequately
briefed?
Standard of Review: "Briefs that do not comply with rule 24 'may be disregarded
or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court.' Utah R. App. P. 24(j)." State v.
Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, fl 8,1 P.3d 1108.

Issue II: Did the district court properly deny and dismiss the petition for postconviction relief?
Standard of Review: The following standard of review applies:
Our standard of review for an appeal from a dismissal of a petition for
post-conviction relief depends on the issue appealed. Though we
review the trial court's conclusions of law for correctness, we will disturb
findings of fact only if they are clearly erroneous. Further, '"we survey
the record in the light most favorable to the findings and judgment; and
we will not reverse if there is a reasonable basis therein to support the
trial court's refusal to be convinced that the writ should be granted.'"
Matthews v. Galetka, 958 P.2d 949, 950 (Utah App. 1998) (citations omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules relate to this
appeal:
Addendum A - Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65C
Addendum B - Post-Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code Ann. §7835a-101 through § 78-35a-110 (1996)
Addendum C - Burglary - Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1995), and Theft Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner was charged with burglary, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Annotated § 76-6-202 (1995), and theft, a third degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-404 (1995) (R. 487-88). After initially requesting a jury
trial, petitioner chose to try his case to the bench (R.342). Following a bench trial on
April 2,1997, petitioner was convicted of both counts (R. 339). After several delays,
2

petitioner was sentenced to two consecutive zero-to-five year sentences on July 7,
1997 (R. 336-37).
Petitioner appealed his conviction and sentence. This Court affirmed in a
memorandum decision dated September 11,1998 (R. 317-19) (Addendum D).
In June 1999, petitioner filed a petition for post conviction relief (entitled an
application for writ of habeas corpus) in district court (R. 1-200). In a Memorandum
Decision dated June 30, 1999, the court summarily dismissed petitioner's claims
relating to discretion of the trial judge, imposition of consecutive sentences, and
insufficiency of the evidence, because these issues were (or should have been)
raised on direct appeal (R. 205-210) (Addendum E). The court directed that a copy
of the petition be served on the Utah Attorney General, with respect to petitioner's
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id.
The original petition named A. C. Newland, the warden of a prison in
California, as the respondent. Petitioner was incarcerated in California through the
Interstate Compact. However, petitioner remains under the Utah Department of
Corrections, and his release date will be determined by the Utah Board of Pardons.
Since the Utah Attorney General is not counsel for and does not represent Warden
Newland of the California State prison, the office of the Utah Attorney General filed
a motion to dismiss the petition without prejudice, to allow petitioner to file an

3

amended or corrected petition naming the State of Utah as the respondent (R. 211215).1
In July 1999, petitioner filed an amended petition (R. 219-228). However, in
addition to changing the respondent to the State of Utah, the amended petition
included new and additional claims.

The district court summarily dismissed

petitioner's new claims which related to the scheduling of the trial and allegations
that the State suppressed exculpatory evidence on direct appeal (R. 242-246)
(Addendum F). The Court then directed the Attorney General to respond to those
points designated as arguments 3, 4, 6, and 7 within the petitioner's amended
petition. Those claims alleged ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to secure
defense witnesses, for failing to use defense funds to place an add in local papers
to ascertain defense witnesses, for failing to introduce crime scene photographs, for
stipulating to the intent to commit theft, and for failing to file a reply brief on appeal
(R. 242-246).
The State filed a written response to the claims specified by the court (R.
513). On January 20, 2000, after receiving the State's written response, the court
entered a memorandum decision which held that "even if the facts are as
represented by the petitioner, he has failed to show any basis upon which the court
could find his counsel ineffective for failing to pursue the unidentified couple. That
1

Rule 65C(h), Utah R. Civ. P. provides that "[i]f the petition is a challenge
to a felony conviction or sentence, the respondent is the state of Utah represented by the Attorney General."
4

claim is hereby dismissed summarily." (R. 555) (Addendum G). The Court also
dismissed petitioner's allegation that he received ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel when his counsel told the Court of Appeals there was no dispute that the
petitioner intended to commit a theft (R. 553-54).
On May 9, 2000, the court held an evidentiary hearing on whether petitioner
received ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to interview or call Detective
Orton as a witness, and for failing to introduce photographs at trial (R. 553-57, 59495).
On May 11, 2000, the district court entered a final written memorandum
decision which denied and dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief (R. 596605) (Addendum H). Petitioner timely appeals.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In the early evening of January 24, 1997, petitioner and his companion,
Shanta Venson, drove into Cedar City in a red Jaguar sports car (R. 431, 375).
They stopped at Maurice's, a clothing store, where Venson purchased several items
using a credit card (R. 374, 364). A short time later the two pulled into the parking
lot of a Deseret Industries Thrift Store ["Dl"] (R. 373). Although the Dl had just
closed, the front doors to the main floor of the store remained unlocked so that
employees could bring in sales merchandise from the front sidewalk (R. 435-36).
Following standard procedure, employees had placed a "CLOSED" sign on the front
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door and turned off the bank of lights closest to the front of the store (R. 435, 411,
407, 389).
Petitioner and Venson entered the store separately (R. 372).

Venson

remained near the front of the store to choose a belt while petitioner moved to the
back of the store among the clothing racks (R. 418, 416, 398). Another couple
entered the store soon after (R. 418). There were no Dl employees on the sales
floor at this time (R. 419, 363).
Store manager Dennis Goldsworthy was putting away the day's receipts and
preparing the daily deposit in his private office at the back of the store (R. 435,423).
Hearing unfamiliar voices at the front of the store, he left his office to investigate (R.
434-35). He left a bank deposit bag containing $794.00 in cash and $329.96 in
checks sitting on his desk in his office (R. 427-29). When he reached the front of the
store he informed Venson and the other couple that the store was closed (R. 434).
The second couple left immediately, but Venson became "somewhat animated" and
repeatedly insisted on purchasing a fifty-cent belt (R. 433-34). Goldsworthy, who
was unaware that petitioner was also in the store, agreed to sell her the belt but only
if she had exact change (R. 434,420). He explained that all of the money had been
removed from the cash registers (R. 434).
As Goldsworthy performed the transaction, Dl employee Joy Stover came up
the stairs to the mainfloor(R. 399). Stover observed petitioner near the manager's
office and saw him "walk over behind the clothes fixture and kind of slink down and
6

walk towards the front of the store" (R. 398, 392). As petitioner wove his way
towards the front door, she noticed the bank bag in his hand and watched him "put
the bag under his shirt" (R. 396-97). Petitioner and Venson exited the store together
(R. 431).
When Stover told Goldsworthy what she had seen, Goldsworthy immediately
rushed to the office and discovered that the bank bag was missing (R. 431-33,395).
Store employees raced to the parking lot and approached the closest vehicle, which
was occupied by the couple that had entered the store after petitioner (R. 402, 38283). By the time the employees determined that petitioner and Venson were not in
the car, petitioner's red Jaguar was leaving the parking lot (R. 431). The employees
then notified police about the incident and described petitioner's vehicle (R. 382).
A report of the incident with the vehicle description went out on the police
radio (R. 460-61). Officer Preston Griffiths was patrolling 1-15 northbound near
Parowan when he heard the report (R. 458). Shortly thereafter, he saw a car
matching the report's description speed past him (R. 457).

Officer Griffiths

eventually caught up with the car and pulled it over after it exited 1-15 (R. 456a).2
When petitioner got out of the Jaguar and came toward the police car, Officer
Griffiths drew his weapon, ordered petitioner onto the ground and handcuffed him
(R. 456-456a). A subsequent search of the vehicle uncovered the bank bag, torn up
2

This page is not numbered. Since it lies between the pages designated
as 456 and 457, the State refers to it as 456a. (The page is stamped with
number 158, which was its designation in the previous direct appeal).
7

checks made out to Deseret Industries, and a deposit slip (R. 438-40). The missing
cash, amounting to $794.00, was found in Venson's left sock (R. 451).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Petitioner's claims should be dismissed because they are inadequately
briefed. Petitioner does not appropriately challenge the decisions of the district
court, but merely attempts to raise the same arguments which he raised in his
petition for post-conviction relief. Rather than provide meaningful legal analysis,
petitioner merely asserts facts and opinions that he believes support his claims and
concludes that he is entitled to relief. This does not conform to the requirements of
the briefing rule.
Even if petitioner's brief is not dismissed for inadequacy, the decision of the
district court should be affirmed because the petition for post-conviction relief was
properly denied and dismissed. The district court acted appropriately when it
summarily dismissed some of petitioner's claims. The court also ruled correctly
when it held that petitioner had not established any ineffectiveness of trial or
appellate counsel.
ARGUMENT
I.

PETITIONER'S CLAIMS SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE THEY ARE
INADEQUATELY BRIEFED.
Petitioner appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief.

However, in his appellate brief, petitioner simply raises the same arguments he
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raised in his post-conviction petition.3 Petitioner does not challenge the decisions
of the district court. He has not argued or established that any of the court's findings
were clearly erroneous, or that its conclusions of law were incorrect. Rather than
provide meaningful legal analysis, petitioner merely asserts facts and opinions that
he believes support his claims, and then concludes that he is entitled to relief. This
does not conform to the requirements of the briefing rule.
Inadequate Briefing. Rule 24 (a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
requires an appellant to include his "contentions and reasons... with respect to the
issues presented," including "citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the
record relied on." This Court does not address issues inadequately briefed under
this rule.4 See State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, fl 6,1 P.3d 1108 (refusing to consider
argument which is inadequately briefed); MacKay v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941, 947-48
(Utah 1998).

3

Petitioner also attempts to raise some new issues which were never
raised in his petition. If a claim was not raised in the petition, and was therefore
not addressed by the district court, it will not be addressed for the first time on
appeal. See Pascual v. Carver, 876 P.2d 364, 366 (Utah 1994). The issues
concerning petitioner's waiver of a jury trial and the failure of his counsel to move
to reduce the charge to a misdemeanor were not raised in the post-conviction
petition. They therefore may not be addressed now.
4

The State acknowledges that pro se briefs must be construed liberally.
SeeMollv. Carter, 179 F.R.D. 609, 610 (1998); Whitney v. State of NM, 113
F.3d 1170,1173 (10th Cir. 1997). However, pro se litigants must still comply with
minimal standards, jd. If errors alleged in the pro se brief, even if properly
presented, would not amount to reversible error, they do not require full analysis.
See State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50, 55 (Utah 1993).
9

Utah courts have consistently held that issues not properly briefed should not
be addressed on appeal. See State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989).
'"A reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent
authority cited.'" State v. Snyder, 932 P.2d 120,130 (Utah App. 1997) (citing State
v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988)).
Petitioner has not properly briefed the issues. His brief does not identify any
specific error by the district court.

It does not cite to the record; nor does it cite

applicable authority. It also does not provide any meaningful legal analysis. See
State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247 (Utah App. 1992); Phillips v. Hatfield, 904 P.2d 1108
(Utah App. 1995).
Petitioner's brief also fails to make clear assertions, leaving the State, and this
Court, the task of divining his position. MacKay, 973 P.2d at 948-49 (rejecting
appellee's and cross-appellant's claim for failure to make clear assertions or to
engage in even a "modicum of analysis" where appellee merely "quote[d] or
paraphrasefd] the record at great length, leaving [the] court with the task of
attempting to divine [appellee's] position").
Petitioner nowhere provides an analytical basis for his claim that denial of his
petition for post-conviction relief should be overturned on appeal. See Utah R. App.
P. 24(a)(9) (providing that argument section of appellant's brief must "contain the
contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented . . .
with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on"); see also
10

State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299,305 (Utah 1998) (holding that "rule 24(a)(9) requires
not just bald citation to authority but development of that authority and reasoned
analysis based on that authority"); State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah
1989) (holding that brief "must contain some support for each contention").
In sum, this Court is not "'a depository in which the appealing party may dump
the burden of argument and research.'" State v. Jaeger, 973 P.2d 404, 410 (Utah
1999) (quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439,450 (Utah 1988)), and see Thomas,
961 P.2d at 305. Accordingly, petitioner's claims should be rejected. See Jaeger,
973 P.2d at 410 (refusing to consider appellant's claim due to the lack of meaningful
analysis of cited authority); Wareham, 772 P.2d at 966 (refusing to address claim on
appeal where petitioner's brief "wholly [lacked] legal analysis and authority to support
his argument"); State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 548-49 (Utah App. 1998) (same);
State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 1992) (same).
Failure to Marshal. Petitioner's claims also fail because his grounds for relief
ignore the district court's findings and conclusions in support of its rulings (R. 20510, 242-46, 551-59, 596-605) (Addenda E, F, G & H).5 The law is well-settled that
although the Court of Appeals will "review the trial court's conclusions of law for
correctness, [it] will disturb findings of fact only if they are clearly erroneous. Further,
'"we survey the record in the light most favorable to the findings and judgment; and
5

Petitioner has also failed to include a copy of the transcript of the
evidentiary hearing held in the post-conviction case. It does not appear that the
hearing was ever transcribed, since a transcript is not part of the court file.
11

we will not reverse if there is a reasonable basis therein to support the trial court's
refusal to be convinced that the writ should be granted.'"" Matthews v. Galetka, 958
P.2d 949, 950 (Utah App. 1998) (citations omitted).
A court's findings are "clearly erroneous only if they 'are against the clear
weight of the evidence'" or if the reviewing court "'reaches a definite and firm
conviction'" that they are mistaken. State v. Gardner, 844 P.2d 293, 295 (Utah
1992) (quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191,193 (Utah 1987)). The burden is on
the petitioner to marshal all of the evidence in support of the district court's findings
and then to demonstrate that the evidence does not support the findings. State v.
Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, 460-61 (Utah 1994). If the petitioner makes no attempt to
marshal the evidence supporting the court's ruling and to demonstrate its
insufficiency, this Court "accept[s] the trial court's findings as stated in its ruling."
State v. Benvenuto, 983 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 1999).
Petitioner fails to carry his burden.

Indeed, petitioner does not even

acknowledge his burden to marshal the evidence supporting the district court's
ruling. Instead, he refers only to facts or events which he believes are favorable to
his position and then broadly asserts that contrary to the district court's ruling, the
record supports his claims. Because petitioner has failed to marshal the supporting
evidence and demonstrate its insufficiency, this Court should accept the district
court's findings. Benvenuto, 983 P.2d at 558.

12

In sum, petitioner's claims are inadequately briefed and neither marshal the
evidence supporting the district court's findings, nor demonstrate its inadequacy.
Therefore, this Court should decline to consider petitioner's challenge to the district
court's ruling denying his petition for post-conviction relief. See Crookston v. Fire
Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789,800 (Utah 1991) (failure to marshal evidence); Jaeger, 973
P.2d at 410 (failure to meaningfully analyze claims).
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED AND DISMISSED THE
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF.
Should this Court excuse the failures of petitioner's brief, review of the action

below nevertheless establishes that the district court properly denied and dismissed
the petition for post-conviction relief.
A.

The district court properly summarily dismissed several of
petitioner's claims.

The district court summarily dismissed several of petitioner's claims (R. 205210,242-246) (Addenda E & F). These claims were dismissed before the State was
ordered to respond, thus the State has not previously addressed these issues (R.
242-246). On appeal, petitioner does not clearly raise these issues. However, in his
"PRAYER FOR RELIEF" (Br. Aplt 22), petitioner alleges that there was insufficient
evidence to convict, and that he was inappropriately sentenced to consecutive terms.
These issues were among the claims which were summarily dismissed by the district
court. Therefore, the State will address these claims now.

13

Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that when a petition for
post-conviction relief is filed, "(t]he assigned judge shall review the petition, and, if
it is apparent to the court that any claim has been adjudicated in a prior proceeding,
or if any claim in the petition appears frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith
issue an order dismissing the claim, stating either that the claim has been
adjudicated or that the claim is frivolous on its face

The order of dismissal need

not recite findings of fact or conclusions of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(g)(1).
Under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, a person is not eligible for relief on
any ground that "was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal" or that "could have
been but was not raised at trial or on appeal." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106 (1996).
In its Memorandum Decision dated June 30,1999, the district court summarily
dismissed petitioner's claims relating to discretion of the trial judge, imposition of
consecutive sentences, and insufficiency of the evidence, because these issues
were "fully adjudicated on appeal, or should have been raised on appeal" (R.
207)(Addendum E).
On direct appeal, this Court addressed the issues related to consecutive
sentences and held that "the trial court did not err in imposing two consecutive
sentences." (R. 317-19) (Addendum D).6 This Court also stated that it would not
consider petitioner's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence because he had
6

The copy of the Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision found in the
record at 317-19 is missing page 2. Therefore, a complete copy of the
Memorandum Decision has been included in Addendum D).
14

failed to marshal the evidence and to demonstrate why the evidence was insufficient,
jd. Thus, the district court properly summarily dismissed these issues.
In July 1999, petitioner filed an amended petition (R. 219-228). The amended
petition included new and additional claims. The district court entered an order
summarily dismissing petitioner's new claims, which related to the scheduling of the
trial and petitioner's allegations that the State suppressed exculpatory evidence on
direct appeal. The basis for this dismissal was the new claims could have been
raised on direct appeal, or the claims were frivolous (R. 242-246) (Addendum F).
Thus, under the statutory guidelines of the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, the
district court properly summarily dismissed these claims.
In addition, petitioner has not alleged on appeal that the district court erred in
summarily dismissing these claims. Petitioner has not raised or addressed these
issues anywhere in his appellate brief. Therefore, the issue of whether the district
court properly summarily dismissed these claims is waived because it was not raised
on appeal. See Pasquin v. Pasquin, 1999 UT App 245, U 21,988 P.2d 1 (issues not
briefed by appellant are deemed waived and abandoned); Pixton v. State Farm
Mutal Auto. Insur. Co. of Bloomington, ///., 809 P.2d 746, 751 (Utah App. 1991)
(where appellant fails to brief an issue, the point is waived).
B.

The district court correctly ruled that petitioner had not
established ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

In his petition for post-conviction relief, petitioner alleged that he received
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ineffective assistance of counsel. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, a petitioner must meet the two-part test established in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). He must show that (1) his attorney's performance
was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced his defense, |d. at 687.
Petitioner alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to
interview Detective Orton or call him as a witness at trial, and failed to introduce
photographs of the scene of the crime (R. 553, 556-57)7
Petitioner also alleged that his counsel was ineffective for failing to take steps
to locate the unidentified couple who were briefly in the Deseret Industries store,
shortly before petitioner committed the theft (R. 556). The State filed a written
response to these claims, as requested by the Court (R. 513).
After receiving the State's written response, the court entered a Memorandum
Opinion which held that "even if the facts are as represented by the petitioner, he
has failed to show any basis upon which the court could find his counsel ineffective
for failing to pursue the unidentified couple.

That claim is hereby dismissed

summarily." (R. 555) (Addendum G).8

7

The district court also noted that at the evidentiary hearing petitioner
attempted to present testimony about other alleged deficiencies in counsel's trial
performance. "However, since those deficiencies were not raised by the
petitioner in his Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, the court declined
to hear that evidence." (R. 602).
8

This claim was not dismissed until after the state had filed its written
response. However, it was dismissed prior to the evidentiary hearing.
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The district court properly dismissed this claim. There was no indication who
these people were, or whether they even lived in the local area. There was also no
indication as to what their testimony would consist of, or even whether their
testimony would help or hurt petitioner's case. It was not ineffective assistance of
counsel to make a decision not to spend additional time and money on an attempt
to locate an unnamed and unknown couple who may not even live in the area and
whose testimony may not have helped the petitioner's case.
After an evidentiary hearing, the Court also dismissed petitioner's other claims
concerning ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The Court ruled that the petitioner
failed to satisfy the two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel set out in
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (R. 599-601).
The district court held that it was clear from the testimony of Detective Orton
at the evidentiary hearing, that his testimony would not have been helpful to the
petitioner at trial (R. 601) (Addendum H, p. 5). The Court held that petitioner failed
to demonstrate how defense counsel erred by failing to call Detective Orton as a
witness. In addition, even if there were any deficiency in not calling him as a
witness, petitioner failed to demonstrate that his defense was prejudiced by failing
to call Detective Orton as a witness (R. 599-601) (Addendum H, pp. 5-7).
The district court also held that petitioner failed to demonstrate that counsel
erred in not taking photographs of the scene, and in relying on the diagram drawn
by a witness at trial. Even if there were any error for failing to take and use
17

photographs, the petitioner failed to demonstrate any prejudice to his case from the
lack of photographs (R. 598-99) (Addendum H, p. 7-8).
The district court correctly ruled that petitioner had failed to establish that he
received ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
On appeal, petitioner does not discuss the court's findings or challenge the
court's ruling on these issues. Petitioner has failed to show that the court's findings
were clearly erroneous, or that its conclusion that petitioner failed to establish
ineffective assistance of counsel was incorrect. See Grosser) v. Dewitt, 1999 UT
App 167, If 10, 982 P.2d 581 ("because appellants do not challenge the court's
findings, let alone demonstrate they are clearly erroneous, we 'assume [] that the
record supports the findings of the district court.'") (quoting Interwest Constr. v.
Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350,1358 (Utah 1996) (citations omitted)).
C.

The district court correctly ruled that petitioner failed
to establish ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel.

In his petition for post-conviction relief, petitioner alleged ineffective assistance
of appellate counsel for failing to raise the issue of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel on direct appeal. Petitioner also alleged that his appellate counsel was
ineffective for failing to file a reply brief, and for acknowledging on appeal that there
was no dispute that petitioner intended to commit theft.
After receiving the State's written response, the district court entered a
memorandum decision which dismissed petitioner's allegation that he received
18

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because his counsel failed to file a reply
brief and told the Court of Appeals there was no dispute that the petitioner intended
to commit a theft (R. 553-54) (Addendum G).9
The district court properly dismissed these claims. In his appellate brief on
direct appeal, counsel said: "Although Defendant does not dispute the theft of the
cash and checks, there was a dispute as to whether he committed a burglary." (R.
494). Petitioner Glasper testified at trial. Upon direct examination, he admitted to
facts amounting to theft. He admitted that he picked up the bank bag, and that he
unzipped it and saw money inside. He also admitted that he then put the bank bag
in his pants and left the store. (R. 365 -68). Appellate counsel cannot change the
facts from trial. Based on these facts, testified to by petitioner, appellate counsel
appropriately conceded that petitioner did not dispute the theft.
Similarly, appellate counsel was not ineffective for not filing a reply brief. After
receiving an opposing party's brief, appellate counsel may be allowed - but is not
required - tofilea reply brief. Rule 24(c) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, states:
"The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee . . . Reply briefs
shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief."
(emphasis added). Thus, a reply brief is not mandatory. In fact, the reply brief is

9

This claim was dismissed after the State's written response, but before
the evidentiary hearing.
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limited to answering new matters set forth in the opposing brief. If no new matters
were set forth in the opposing brief, then no reply brief is necessary.
Here, counsel for petitioner did not simply neglect to file a reply brief. Rather,
he made a specific choice and advised the Court that he did not intend to file a reply
brief (R. 258). Petitioner did not raise any allegations as to why a reply brief should
have been filed or what issues he believed a reply brief could have addressed. He
did not allege that opposing counsel's brief raised any new matters which should
have been addressed in a reply brief. Accordingly, petitioner has not established
that failure to file a reply brief was ineffective assistance of counsel.
After the evidentiary hearing, (which established that there was no ineffective
assistance of trial counsel), the district court found that petitioner had presented no
evidence supporting his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel (R. 598)
(Addendum H). The court held that there was no evidence that the appeal was
mishandled or that counsel's work on the appeal was prejudicial to petitioner, id.
The district court correctly ruled that petitioner failed to establish ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel.
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CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the district court's ruling dismissing the petition for
post-conviction relief.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ d a v of August, 2001.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
ATTORNEY GENERAL

x&

y a / ^ y A jx. o s

ERIN RILEY
Assistant Attorney General
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Addenda

Addendum A

1
Rule 65C. Post-conviction relief.

(a) Scope. This rule shall govern proceedings in all petitions for post-conviction relief filed
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-101 et seq., Post-Conviction Remedies Act.
(b) Commencement and venue. The proceeding shall be commenced byfilinga petition with
the clerk of the district court in the county in which the judgment of conviction was entered. The
petition should be filed on forms provided by the court. The court may order a change of venue
on its own motion if the petition is filed in the wrong county. The court may order a change of
venue on motion of a party for the convenience of the parties or witnesses.
(c) Contents of the petition. The petition shall set forth all claims that the petitioner has in
relation to the legality of the conviction or sentence. Additional claims relating to the legality of
the conviction or sentence may not be raised in subsequent proceedings except for good cause
shown. The petition shall state:
(1) whether the petitioner is incarcerated and, if so, the place of incarceration;
(2) the name of the court in which the petitioner was convicted and sentenced and the dates of
proceedings in which the conviction was entered, together with the court's case number for those
proceedings, if known by the petitioner;
(3) in plain and concise terms, all of the facts that form the basis of the petitioner's claim to
relief;
(4) whether the judgment of conviction, the sentence, or the commitment for violation of
probation has been reviewed on appeal, and, if so, the number and title of the appellate
proceeding, the issues raised on appeal, and the results of the appeal;
(5) whether the legality of the conviction or sentence has been adjudicated in any prior
post-conviction or other civil proceeding, and, if so, the case number and title of those
proceedings, the issues raised in the petition, and the results of the prior proceeding; and
(6) if the petitioner claims entitlement to relief due to newly discovered evidence, the reasons
why the evidence could not have been discovered in time for the claim to be addressed in the
trial, the appeal, or any previous post-conviction petition.
(d) Attachments to the petition. If available to the petitioner, the petitioner shall attach to the
petition:
(1) affidavits, copies of records and other evidence in support of the allegations;
(2) a copy of or a citation to any opinion issued by an appellate court regarding the direct
appeal of the petitioner's case;
(3) a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior post-conviction or other civil
© 2001 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the Lexis-Nexis® Group. All rights reserved.
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proceeding that adjudicated the legality of the conviction or sentence; and
(4) a copy of all relevant orders and memoranda of the court.
(e) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument or citations or
discuss authorities in the petition, but these may be set out in a separate memorandum, two
copies of which shall be filed with the petition.
(f) Assignment. On the filing of the petition, the clerk shall promptly assign and deliver it to
the judge who sentenced the petitioner. If the judge who sentenced the petitioner is not available,
the clerk shall assign the case in the normal course.
(g) (1) Summary dismissal of claims. The assigned judge s hall review the petition, and, if it
is apparent to the court that any claim has been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if any claim
in the petition appears frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith issue an order dismissing the
claim, stating either that the claim has been adjudicated or that the claim is frivolous on its face.
The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with
the entry of the order of dismissal. The order of dismissal need not recite findings of fact or
conclusions of law.
(2) A petition is frivolous on its face when, based solely on the allegations contained in the
pleadings and attachments, it appears that:
(A) the facts alleged do not support a claim for relief as a matter of law;
(B) the claims have no arguable basis in fact; or
(C) the petition challenges the sentence only and the sentence has expired prior to the filing
of the petition.
(3) If a petition is not frivolous on its face but is deficient due to a pleading error or failure to
comply with the requirements of this rule, the court shall return a copy of the petition with leave
to amend within 20 days. The court may grant one additional 20 day period to amend for good
cause shown.
(4) The court shall not review for summary dismissal the initial post-conviction petition in a
case where the petitioner is sentenced to death.
(h) Service of petitions. If, on review of the petition, the court concludes that all or part of the
petition should not be summarily dismissed, the court shall designate the portions of the petition
that are not dismissed and direct the clerk to serve a copy of the petition, attachments and
memorandum by mail upon the respondent. If the petition is a challenge to a felony conviction or
sentence, the respondent is the state of Utah represented by the Attorney General. In ail other
cases, the respondent is the governmental entity that prosecuted the petitioner.
(i) Answer or other response. Within 30 days (plus time allowed under these rules for
service by mail) after service of a copy of the petition upon the respondent, or within such other
period of time as the court may allow, the respondent shall answer or otherwise respond to the
© 2001 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc , a member of the Lexis-Nexis^ Group All rights reserved.
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portions of the petition that have not been dismissed and shall serve the answer or other response
upon the petitioner in accordance with Rule 5(b). Within 30 days (plus time allowed for service
by mail) after service of any motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, the petitioner may
respond by memorandum to the motion. No further pleadings or amendments will be permitted
unless ordered by the court.
(j) Hearings. After pleadings are closed, the court shall promptly set the proceeding for a
hearing or otherwise dispose of the case. The court may also order a prehearing conference, but
the conference shall not be set so as to delay unreasonably the hearing on the merits of the
petition. At the prehearing conference, the court may:
(1) consider the formation and simplification of issues;
(2) require the parties to identify witnesses and documents; and
(3) require the parties to establish the admissibility of evidence expected to be presented at
the evidentiary hearing.
(k) Presence of the petitioner at hearings. The petitioner shall be present at the prehearing
conference if the petitioner is not represented by counsel. The prehearing conference may be
conducted by means of telephone or video conferencing. The petitioner shall be present before
the court at hearings on dispositive issues but need not otherwise be present in court during the
proceeding. The court may conduct any hearing at the correctional facility where the petitioner is
confined.
(1) Discovery; records. Discovery under Rules 26 through 37 shall be allowed by the court
upon motion of a party and a determination that there is good cause to believe that discovery is
necessary to provide a party with evidence that is likely to be admissible at an evidentiary
hearing. The court may order either the petitioner or the respondent to obtain any relevant
transcript or court records.
(m) Orders; stay.
(1) If the court vacates the original conviction or sentence, it shall enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law and an appropriate order. If the petitioner is serving a sentence for a felony
conviction, the order shall be stayed for 5 days. Within the stay period, the respondent shall give
written notice to the court and the petitioner that the respondent will pursue a new trial, pursue a
new sentence, appeal the order, or take no action. Thereafter the stay of the order is governed by
these rules and by the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
(2) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives notice that no action will be taken, the
stay shall expire and the court shall deliver forthwith to the custodian of the petitioner the order
to release the petitioner.
(3) If the respondent gives notice that the petitioner will be retried or resentenced, the trial
court may enter any supplementary orders as to arraignment, trial, sentencing, custody, bail,
discharge, or other matters that may be necessary and proper.
© 2001 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc , a member of the Lexis-Nexis® Group All rights reserved
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(n) Costs. The court may assign the costs of the proceeding, as allowed under Rule 54(d), to
any party as it deems appropnate. If the petitioner is indigent, the court may direct the costs to be
paid by the governmental entity that prosecuted the petitioner. If the petitioner is in the custody
of the Department of Corrections, Section 64-13-23 and sections 21-7-3 through 21-7-4 7 govern
the manner and procedure by which the tnal court shall determine the amount, if any, to charge
for fees and costs.
(o) Appeal Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition may be appealed to and
reviewed by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court of Utah in accord with the statutes
governing appeals to those courts.
History: Added effective July 1,1996.

© 2001 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc , a member of the Lexis-Nexis^ Group All rights reserved

Addendum B

JUDICIAL CODE

78-35a-101
PARTI
GENERAL PROVISIONS

78-35a-101. Short title.
This act shall be known as the "Post-Convictjon Remedies
Act"
lies
78-35a-102. Replacement of prior remedies.
(1) This chapter establishes a substantive legal remedy for
any person who challenges a conviction or sentence for a
criminal offense and who has exhausted all other legal remedies, including a direct appeal except as provided in Subsection (2) Procedural provisions for filing and commencement of
a petition are found in Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(2) This chapter does not apply tola) habeas corpus petitions that do not challenge a
conviction or sentence for a criminal offense,
(b) motions to correct a sentence pursuant to Rule
22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; or
(c) actions taken by the Board of Pardons and Parole.
less
78-35a-103. Applicability — Effect on petitions.
Except for the limitation period established in Section
78-35a-107, this chapter applies only to post-conviction proceedings filed on or after July 1,1996.
lsee
78-36*104. Grouiidsforrelief—Retroactivity of rule,
(1) Unless precluded by Section 78-36a-106 or 78-36a-107, a
person who has been convicted and sentenced for a criminal
offense may file an action m the district court of original
jurisdiction for post-conviction relief to vacate or modify the
conviction or sentence upon the following grounds:
(a) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was
imposed in violation of the United States Constitution or
Utah Constitution;
(b) the conviction was obtained under a statute* that is
in violation of the United States Constitution or Utah
Constitution, or the conduct for which the petitioner was
prosecuted is constitutionally protected;
(c) the sentence was imposed m an unlawful manner,
or probation was revoked m an unlawful manner,
(d) the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel
in violation of the United States Constitution or Utah
Constitution, or
(e) newly discovered material evidence exists that requires the court to vacate the conviction or sentence,
because:
d) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel
knew of the evidence at the time of trial or sentencing
or in time to include the evidence in any previously
filed post-trial motion or post-conviction proceeding,
and the evidence could not have been discovered
through the exercise of reasonable diligence,
(u) the material evidence is not merely cumulative
of evidence that was known;
(in) the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence; and
(iv) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly
discovered material evidence demonstrates that no
reasonable trier of fact could have found the petitioner guilty of the offense or subject to the sentence
received
(2) The question of whether a petitioner is entitled to the
benefit of a rule announced by the United States Supreme
Court, Utah Supreme Court, or Utah Court of Appeals after
the petitioner s conviction became final shall be governed by
applicable state and federal principles of retroactivity
lies
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78-36V106. Burden of proof.
The petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving by a
preponderance of die evidence the facts necessary to entitle
the petitioner to relief The respondent has the burden of
pleading any ground of preclusion under Section 78-35a-106,
but once a ground has been pled, the petitioner has the burden
to disprove its existence by a preponderance of the evidence
199*

7S-35a-lO& Preclusion of relief — Exception.
( D A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon
any ground that
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial
motion,
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal,
(c) could have been but was not raised at tnal or on
appeal,
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for
post-conviction relief or could have been, but was not
raised in s previous request for post-conviction relief or
(e) is barred by the limitation period established m
Section 78-35a-107
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (lXc), a person may be
eligible for relief on a basis that the ground could have been
but was not raised at tnal or on appeal, if the failure to raise
that ground was due to ineffective aaaiatance of counsel lsee
7*46e>107. Statute of limitations for poet-conviction
relief.
(1) A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is
filed within one year after the cause of action has accrued
(2) For purposes of this section, the cause of action accrues
on the latest of the following dates:
(a) the last dayforfilingan appealfromthe entry of the
final judgment of conviction, if no appeal is taken,
(b) the entry of the decision of the appellate court
which has jurisdiction over the case, if an appeal is taken,
(c) the last day for filing s petition for writ of certiorari
in the Utah Supreme Court or the United States Supreme
Court, if no petition for writ of certiorari is filed,
(d) the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of
certiorari or the entry of the decision on the petition for
certiorari review, if a petition for writ of certiorari is filed,
or
(e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have
known, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the petition is based
(3) If the court finds that the interests of justice require, a
court may excuse s petitioner's failure to file within the time
limitations.
(4) Sections 78-12-35 and 78-12-40 do not extend the limitations period established in this section.
lsee
78-36e>10*. Effect of granting relief — Notice.
(1) If the court grants the petitioner's request for relief, it
shall either
(a) modify the original conviction or sentence or
(b) vacate the original conviction or sentence and order
a new trial or sentencing proceeding as appropriate
(2) (a) If the petitioner is serving a felony sentence the
order shall be stayed for five days Within the stay period,
the respondent shall give written notice to the court and
the petitioner that the respondent will pursue a new trial
or sentencing proceedings, appeal the order, or take no
action.
(b) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives
notice at any time during the stay penod that it intends to
take no action, the court shall lift the stay and deliver the
order to the custodian of the petitioner
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(c) If the respondent gives notice that it intends to retry
or resentence the petitioner, the trial court may order any
supplementary orders as to arraignment, trial, sentencing, custody, bail, discharge, or other matters that may be
necessary.
ise*
78-35a-109. Appointment of counsel.
(1) If any portion of the petition is not summarily dismissed, the court may, upon the request of an indigent
petitioner, appoint counsel on a pro bono basis. Counsel who
represented the petitioner at trial or on the direct appeal may
not be appointed to represent the petitioner under this section.
(2) In determining whether to appoint counsel, the court
shall consider the following factors:
(a) whether the petition contains factual allegations
that will require an evidentiary hearing; and
(b) whether the petition involves complicated issues of
law or fact that require the assistance of counsel for
proper adjudication.
(3) An allegation that counsel appointed under this section
was ineffective cannot be the basis for relief in any subsequent
post-conviction petition.
itss
78-36a-110. Appeal — Jurisdiction.
Any party may appeal from the trial court's final judgment
on a petition for post-conviction relief to the appellate court
having jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78-2-2 or 78-2a-3.
IMS

78-36-3

Addendum C

1
76-6-202. Burglary.
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a building or any
portion of a building with intent to commit a felony or theft or commit an assault on any person.
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a dwelling, in which
event it is a felony of the second degree.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-202, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-202.
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76-6-404. Theft - Elements.
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the property of
another with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
History: C. 1953,76-6-404, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-404.
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Addendum D

FILED
SEP 1 1 1998
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
COURT OF APPEALS

ooOoo

S t a t e of Utah,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

Case No. 971439-CA

Roy Lee Glasper,
Defendant and Appellant

FILED
(September 11, 1998)

Fifth District, Cedar City Department
The Honorable J. Philip Eves
Attorneys:

Floyd W. Holm, Cedar City, for Appellant
Jan Graham and Kris C. Leonard, Salt Lake City, for
Appellee

Before Judges Wilkins, Jackson, and Orme.
ORME, Judge:
Whether the trial court correctly imposed two sentences is a
question of law that we review for correctness. See State v.
Stettina, 868 P.2d 108, 109 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)• Appellant may
be punished for both burglary and theft unless both were
established by "the same act . . . under a single criminal
episode." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1) (1995). The trial court
concluded--and the State does not now dispute—that appellant's
burglary and theft were part of a single criminal episode.
Accordingly, the trial court may only punish appellant for crimes
that "were a result of separate and distinct acts that resulted
in separate and distinct crimes." State v. O'Brien. 721 P.2d
896, 900 (Utah 1986) (holding trial court did not err in imposing
sentences for four separate crimes).
Appellant misstates the law in arguing that although neither
burglary nor theft is a lesser included offense of the other, in

this case he could not have committed one without the other and,
therefore, he should not be punished for both. In fact,
appellant completed the burglary when he unlawfully entered for
the purpose of committing a theft--regardless of whether he
completed the theft. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202(1) (1995).
Likewise, appellant committed the theft by exercising control
over another's property with the intent to deprive--regardless of
whether the property was in a location open to the public. See
id. § 76-6-404 (1995). Therefore, notwithstanding the single
criminal episode, ff[t]hese are separate acts requiring proof of
different elements and constitute separate offenses." State v.
Suarez, 736 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

See Duran v.

Cook. 788 P.2d 1038, 1040 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (concluding theft
is not lesser included offense of burglary). See also State v.
Porter. 705 P.2d 1174, 1178 (Utah 1985) ("Although defendant's
crimes were committed during a single criminal episode, he
committed two distinct burglaries separately punishable under
section 76-1-402."). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in
imposing two consecutive sentences.
We will not consider appellant's challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the burglary conviction.
To challenge the verdict in a criminal bench trial on the grounds
of insufficient evidence, appellant must "marshal all the
evidence in support of the trial court's findings of fact and
then demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom," even viewed in the light most
favorable to the court below, "is insufficient to support the
findings against an attack." State v. Moosman. 794 P.2d 474,
475-76 (Utah 1990). When a defendant merely "reargue[s] [his]
case by recounting a version of the facts most favorable to [the]
defendant while ignoring" evidence supporting the conviction, he
has neither marshaled the evidence nor demonstrated why it is
insufficient. State v. Scheel. 823 P.2d 470, 473 (Utah Ct. App.
1991) .
Appellant asserts that the record contained conflicting
evidence and points to those facts supporting a finding that the
theft occurred without an unlawful entry. In so doing, appellant
neither marshals the evidence favorable to the trial court's
finding nor does he demonstrate how that evidence is somehow
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insufficient to support the pertinent findings and resulting
conviction.1
Affirmed.

^(TX-

Gregory JSr Orme, Judge

WE CONCUR:

Michael J. Wilkins,
Associate Presiding Judge

Noionan H. Jacksqj^T Judge

1. In one limited respect, appellant's challenge presents a
question of law not dependent on his first marshaling the
evidence. Appellant argues that entry into the manager's office
was not unlawful if the store was open to the public. In
support, he points to an Alaska case which held that the
defendant did not commit burglary by entering a beer cooler
designated "employees only" because it was in a public grocery
and liquor store. See Arabie v. State, 699 P.,2d 890, 892, 895
(Alaska Ct. App. 1985). Arabie is inapposite, however, because,
unlike the Utah Code, the Alaska statute does not contemplate
unlawful entry into a portion of a building. See id. at 892;
Alaska Stat. § 11.46.310(a) (Michie 1996).
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Addendum E

FILED
JUN 3 " 1999
5th DISTRICT COURT
IRON COUNTY
DEPUTY CLERK
™

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROY LEE GLASPER,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiff,

vs.

CASE NO. 990500385

A.C. NEWLAND,
Defendant.

This matter comes before the court pursuant to Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. The case began on June 21, 1999, with the filing of Petitioner's Application For
Writ Of Habeas Corpus, Affidavit of Impecuniosity, and Motion For Appointment Of Counsel.
The court has reviewed the filings and now enters the following findings, conclusions and
decisions.
Applicable Rule of Procedure
Petitioner brings his Application For Writ Of Habeas Corpus under the provisions of
Rule 65B of the Rules of Civil Procedure (URCP). Since the Petitioner's Application
challenges his conviction and sentence for a criminal offense, it is actually an Application
which should be brought under the provisions of Rule 65C URCP and Utah's Post Conviction

Remedies Act, 78-35a-101, et seg^ This court will consider this Application pursuant to that
Rule and those statutory provisions.

Motion For Appointment Of Counsel
The Petitioner has requested that the State of Utah, or one of its political subdivisions,
provide him with legal counsel to pursue this Application on his behalf. Under the law of this
State, the Petitioner is not entitled to such legal counsel for the prosecution of a proceeding
such as is currently before the court. This court has no resources available to provide legal
assistance to the Petitioner and therefore denies his Motion. No legal counsel will be
provided.
Impecuniositv Affidavit
It is apparent from the Petitioner's Affidavit and circumstances that he is unable to pay
the costs of this proceeding, and the court so finds. Petitioner is allowed to proceed without
paying the usual filing fees.
Jurisdictional Issues
In reviewing the Application, the court notes that the Petitioner is confined in the
California Prison System. Petitioner does not state why he is entitled to relief from a Utah
court. However, since the court has no facts, the court will assume that jurisdiction exists for
the present. Likewise, the Petition does not specify whether the named Respondent, A.C.
Newland, is the California custodian of the Petitioner or someone in Utah who holds the
Petitioner in custody.

Summary Dismissal of Some Claims
Rule 65C (g)(1) URCP provides as follows:
"Summary dismissal of claims. The assigned judge shall review the petition,
and, if it is apparent to the court that any claim has been adjudicated in a prior
proceeding, or if any claim in the petition appears frivolous on its face, the court shall
forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim, stating either that the claim has been
adjudicated or that the claim is frivolous on its face. The order shall be sent by mail to
the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with the entry of the order of
dismissal. The order of dismissal need not recite findings of fact or conclusions of
law."
Rule 65C (g) (2) URCP provides as follows:
"A petition is frivolous on its face when, based solely on the allegations contained in
the pleadings and attachments, it appears that:
(A) the facts alleged do not support a claim for relief as a matter of law;
(B) the claims have no arguable basis in fact; or
(C) the petition challenges the sentence only and the sentence has expired prior
to the filing of the petition."
Section 78-35a-106 Utah Code Annotated (UCA) provides as follows:
"(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground that:
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion;
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal;
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal;
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction
relief or could have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for postconviction relief; or
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78-35a-107."
A review of the Application filed by the Petitioner quickly reveals that Petitioner is
attempting to re-litigate claims already ruled upon during the direct appeal in this case. In a
Memorandum Decision issued September 11, 1998, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the
consecutive sentences imposed by the trial court. In that same Decision, the Court of Appeals

refused to consider the claims of the appellant relating to the sufficiency of the evidence
because the appellant had failed to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's decision.
In the footnote the same court held that the entry into the manager's office could constitute a
burglary because of the wording of Utah's burglary statute.
In his Application, Petitioner challenges the imposition of consecutive sentences by the
trial court, claims that the trial judge abused his discretion is imposing that sentence and claims
that he received ineffective assistance of counsel from trial and appellate counsel, However, in
his Memorandum Of Points And Authorities In Support Of Petition For Writ Of Habeas
Corpus filed contemporaneously with the Application, the Petitioner argues the sufficiency of
the evidence at trial and the ineffective counsel issues.
It is apparent that the issues raised by Petitioner have been fully adjudicated on appeal,
or should have been raised on appeal, with the possible exception of the claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Pursuant to the Rules and statute cited above, the Petitioner is not
entitled to raise those adjudicated issues by this Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus.
Accordingly, the court now summarily dismisses the Petitioner's claims related to the
imposition of consecutive sentences, the abuse of discretion of the trial judge for imposing
consecutive sentences, and the insufficiency of the evidence.
At this point the court is unable to determine if the Petitioner's claims of ineffective
assistance have, or should have, been raised on appeal. Accordingly, pursuant to URCP, Rule
65C (h), the clerk is hereby directed to serve a copy of this Order, the Application and all

4

attachments, as well as Petitioner's Memorandum of Points and Authorities on the Attorney
General for the State of Utah. The clerk is also to mail a copy of this order to the Petitioner.
DATED this 30th day of June 1999.

Jy^fHLIP EVES, ^strict Court Judge
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Certificate of Mailing
I hereby certify that on this 30th day of June 1999,1 mailed true and correct copies of
the above and foregoing document, first-class postage prepaid, to the following:
Roy Lee Glasper, K90014
P.O. Box 4000, Bid 4-222
Vacaville, CA 95696-4000
Jan C. Graham, Esq.
Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
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Maxine Munson, Deputy Clerk
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Addendum F

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROY LEE GLASPER,

ORDER
Petitioner,
CASE NO. 990500385 WR

vs.
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A.C. NEWLAND,
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Respondent.
5th
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This matter came before the court this date for review of the file. The court determinea
that since its Memorandum Decision of June 30, 1999, the parties have been filing documents
which have not been brought to the court's attention by courtesy copies or by Notice to Submit
For Decision. Having now reviewed those filings, the court now enters the following
Findings, Conclusions and Order.
In its Memorandum Decision, the court directed that the Petitioner's Application For
Writ Of Habeas Corpus was to be served upon the Attorney General of the State of Utah for a
response, as required by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
On July 19, 1999, Erin Riley, Assistant Attorney General for Utah filed the State's
Motion To Dismiss asking that the Petition be dismissed without prejudice. The Motion was
based on the form of the Petition which appeared to name as respondent an official of the
California Penal System, where Mr. Glasper is serving his Utah sentences. The Utah Attorney
General took the position in the Motion to Dismiss that it had no authority to represent the
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California prison official holding Mr Glasper and asked that the Petition by dismissed so Mr
Glasper could file an amended Petitioner naming a Utah respondent.
Instead of filing a response to the Motion To Dismiss, Mr. Glasper sent a handwritten
letter to the court in which he referenced the Motion by Erin Riley. That letter was filed with
the court on July 19, 1999. The letter did not oppose the Motion but indicated that the
Petitioner intended to amend his petition.
On July 26, 1999, the Petitioner filed with the court an Amended Petition For Writ Of
Habeas Corpus. This filing was not brought to the attention of this, or any other judge of this
court. The Amended Petition seems to raise new issues as well as some of the issues
previously dismissed from the original Petition filed by Mr. Glasper.
On August 11, 1999, Mr. Glasper caused to be filed a Request For Extension Of Time
In Which To File A Notice Of Appeal.
On August 9, 1999, the Attorney General for Utah filed a Motion For Clarification
asking if the court had ruled on the Motion to Dismiss and asking for clarification of the need
to respond to the Amended Petition now on file.
Having now learned of the various filings by the parties since the court's Memorandum
Decision, the court now enters the following:
1. Ruling on the Motion to Dismiss;
2. Ruling on the Request For Extension Of Time In Which To File A Notice Of
Appeal; and
3. Ruling on the Motion For Clarification.
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Motion To Dismiss
The time for a response to this motion has now expired with no opposition having been
filed by Mr. Glasper. Indeed, Mr. Glasper has filed an Amended Petition, which the court
takes as an indication that he does not oppose the Motion To Dismiss as long as he is able to
file the Amended Petition. Therefore, the court now grants the Motion to Dismiss and the
original Petition is hereby dismissed without prejudice to the filing of an amended petition
naming the State Of Utah as respondent.

Request For Extension Of Time In Which To File A Notice Of Appeal
The time for response to this Request has also expired with no opposition from the State
of Utah. However, since there is no final, appealable order in this case from which Mr.
Glasper can appeal, the Request is hereby denied, as it is premature.

Motwm for Clarification
Having now ruled on the Motion To Dismiss, the court has already dealt with some of
the issues raised in the State's Motion. The State's Motion To Dismiss has been granted.
The court hereby rules that the Amended Petition filed by Mr. Glasper shall be treated
as timely filed and presently before the court.
In compliance with Rule 65C, the court has now reviewed the Amended Petition to
determine whether any or all of the issues raised therein are subject to summary dismissal for
being frivolous, or for having been previously adjudicated. In its Memorandum Decision of
June 30, 1999, the court held that the claims of the petitioner raised in the original petition
were subject to summary dismissal, except the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
3

These claims were dismissed because they were raised and ruled upon, or should have been
raised during the direct appeal.
In his Amended Petition, Mr. Giasper again argues that the evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction, and claims abuse of discretion by the trial judge in finding him guilty.
These issues have been adjudicated on direct appeal, or should have been raised on direct
appeal and therefore they are again order summarily dismissed by this court. Likewise, Mr.
Giasper should have raised his claims relating to the scheduling of the trial and his allegations
that the State suppressed exculpatory evidence on direct appeal. Those claims are likewise
dismissed as frivolous. These rulings dispose of the portions of the Amended Petition
designated as Arguments 1,2, and 5.
At this point, without any factual setting, the court is unable to determine whether the
claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel are frivolous. The State Of Utah
is directed to respond to those points designated as Arguments 3, 4, 6, and 7 within the time
limits set out in Rule 65C. The clerk will mail a copy of this Order to the Attorney General
for the State of Utah, care of Assistant Erin Riley and to the Petitioner.
DATED this Q

~~day of September 1999.

J. P#fLIP EVES, Di&ict Court Judge
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Certificate of Mailing
I hereby certify that on this % day of September 1999, I mailed true and correct
copies of the above and foregoing document, first-class postage prepaid, to the following:
Roy Lee Glasper
#K-90014 / Bid. 23-C-3U
CSP-Solano
P.O. Box 4000
Vacaville, CA 95695-4000
Erin Riley, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854

Maxine Munson, Deputy Clerk
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Addendum G

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROY LEE GLASPER,

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Petitioner,

vs.

CASE NO. 990500385 WR

STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent.
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This matter comes before the court for decision on the pending Petition For PostConviction Relief (Petition) and "Motion to compel Deputy Attorney General Erin Riley to
prepare and forward copies of case Law." (hereinafter Motion To Compel), both filed by
Petitioner Roy Lee Glasper. The court has reviewed the record and the submissions of the
parties and now finds and rules as follows.
Motion To Compel
Petitioner was sentenced in Utah to two consecutive terms of 0 to 5 years in the State
prison upon his conviction for theft and burglary. He is currently incarcerated in a California
Prison, having been transferred there at this own request. He is still under the jurisdiction of
the Utah Board of Pardons.
Mr. Glasper filed his petition in this state and this court, raising various claims of
impropriety relating to his conviction and sentence. The court ordered his claims dismissed as
frivolous, except those raising claims relating to his assertion that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel. (See the court's Memorandum Decision of September 8, 1999.)
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The Utah Attorney General filed a Response to the remaining claims on November 12,
1999. Thereafter, on November 15, 1999, Mr. Glasper filed his Motion To Compel, in which
he seeks an order of this court requiring the Utah Attorney General to "...prepare true and
clear, complete copies of all case law, Statutes, and referred to material that cannot be found in
the prison law library here at Solano State Prison in California."
Assistant Attorney General Erin Riley, who represents the State of Utah in this matter,
has filed an objection to Petitioner's Motion To Compel. The State argues that it lacks the
resources to comply with Mr. Glasper's unusual request. The State further argues that there is
no legal requirement that Mr. Glasper be provided legal research by the State's counsel in a
proceeding brought be Mr. Glasper under the provisions of Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
There has been no response to the State's objection by Mr. Glasper, even though the
objection was filed on December 13, 1999.
The court is not aware of any statute or case law requiring counsel for the respondent in
a post-conviction relief case to provide the pro se petitioner with copies of the legal research
upon which the respondent relies. This court sees no reason to order that procedure in this
case. The petitioner's Motion To Compel is overruled and denied.
To grant the motion would place the State's attorney in the position of supplying the
petitioner with his legal research. The burden of supplying the petitioner with legal authorities
rests upon the petitioner, even though he is representing himself. It is enough that the State's
representative provides the citation to the cases and statutes upon which it relies. These

materials are published, and it is up to the respondent to go to the effort of obtaining any
copies which he chooses to review.
In addition, there is no affidavit or other proof before the court that the Solano State
Prison library does not contain these materials, except the unsworn statement of the petitioner.
The problem may well be that the petitioner lacks the legal research skills to locate those cases,
and it is clear to this court that Mr. Glasper is not entitled to enlist the legal expertise of the
opposing counsel to do that research or provide it to petitioner.
The issues remaining to be resolved in this case relate to the petitioner's claims of
ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The petitioner has adequately addressed
the issues raised by the leading case in the area, Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668
(1984), and has cited that case in his pleadings. The determination to be made is not legally
complicated.
Petition For Post-Conviction Relief
The Petition currently before the court is the Amended Petition For Writ of Habeas
Corpus, Post Conviction Remedies, (hereinafter Petition) filed by the petitioner on July 26,
1999. The State of Utah has now responded to the arguments numbered 3, 4, 6, and 7 in the
Petition, as ordered by this court. Likewise, the petitioner has filed his reply to the State's
response. Having reviewed the file, and the submissions of the parties, the court now rules as
follows.

Argument #3
Petitioner asserts that his trial counsel, Floyd W. Holm, was ineffective because he
3
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failed to call "Detective Orton" as a witness at the trial or to get in touch with him. The State
properly points out that the petitioner did not include in his petition any reference to what
Detective Orton might have said at trial to assist him in his defense.
In his reply, however, petitioner alleges that he was shown Detective Orton's police
report and that it contained quotes from witnesses that would have buttressed petitioner's claim
that the money bag in this case was taken from the counter in the main part of the store, and
not from the manager's office. Petitioner points out that if Detective Orton was told by the
witnesses that he took the money from the sales counter, rather than from the manager's office,
the outcome on the burglary charge may have been different.
The court finds that an evidentiary hearing should be scheduled to allow the parties to
question witnesses on this issue. The court would be aided by an opportunity to review
Detective Orton's report, and to hear testimony from defense counsel about the decision not to
call Detective Orton to impeach the prosecution's witnesses, assuming the statements made by
the witnesses differ from their testimony at the trial.

Argument #4
Petitioner asserts that his trial counsel, Floyd W. Holm, was ineffective because he did
not take reasonable steps to locate an unidentified couple who were briefly in the Deseret
Industries store while the petitioner and his niece were there shortly before the theft of the
money. Petitioner argues that Mr. Holm should have obtained investigation funds from the
court to place an add in an attempt to identify these unnamed witnesses. In his reply the
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petitioner admits that the attempt to locate these witnesses would have been a long shot and
that he has no idea what they may have seen or what they might say at the trial.
The State response is that the petitioner has wholly failed to show that counsel's
decision not to place an add was prejudicial him. The identity of the couple was never
obtained. They left the scene while the police and the Deseret Industries employees were busy
trying to apprehend the petitioner and his niece. There is no description of them or their
vehicle. No one connected with this case has any information about where they might live.
No one knows if their testimony would have hurt or helped the petitioner.
The court agrees with the State. To prevail on these claims, the petitioner must meet
the burden of demonstrating that the conduct of counsel was ineffective under the two prong
test articulated in the Strickland v. Washington case cited above. Certainly counsel was within
his discretion to decline to pursue unknown and unidentified witnesses, especially when there
was no way of knowing what they might say. Such an approach might well have developed
damaging evidence which the prosecution and police had not unearthed.
Therefore, court now finds that even if the facts are as represented by the petitioner, he
has failed to show any basis upon which the court could find his counsel ineffective for failing
to pursue the unidentified couple. That claim is hereby dismissed summarily.
In this portion of his amended petition, petitioner also makes reference to certain
photographs which he claims were taken at the store by Mr. Holm. Petitioner asserts that Mr.
Holm told him that the photographs had evidentiary value, but never introduced the photos as
evidence at the trial.
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The court is of the opinion, and now rules, that the petitioner is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing on the issue of the photographs so that the photographs may be presented
to the court and Mr. Holm questioned about his decision not to introduce them at the trial.

Argument #6
Petitioner asserts that his appellate counsel, Mr. Floyd Holm, gave him ineffective
assistance when he told the Court of Appeals that there was no dispute that the petitioner
intended to commit a theft when he picked up the money bag, secreted it in his clothing and
left the store.
The State responds that the position taken before the Court of Appeals was the same
position taken at the trial, and was consistent with the petitioner's own testimony at the time of
the trial.
The Court now rules, summarily, that the petitioner has failed to raise any justiciable
issue in this argument and that he has failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel as
a matter of law. His claims under this portion of his Petition are hereby dismissed.

Argument #7
Petitioner again asserts that his appellate counsel was ineffective by admitted to the
Court of Appeals that the petitioner entered the store to commit a theft and by not filing a reply
brief before that court.
In its response, the State quotes the portion of Mr. Holm's brief which gave rise to
petitioner's complaint. Mr. Holm actually told the Court of Appeals "Although Defendant
does not dispute the theft of the cash and checks, there was a dispute as to whether he
6
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committed a burglary." (Quoting Appellants Brief, p. 4.) The State points out that Mr.
Holm's statement is entirely consistent with the position of the petitioner before the trial court
and the petitioner's own testimony there.
The court finds that the claim of the petitioner regarding the above quoted statement in
the brief filed with the Court of Appeals does not, as a matter of law, demonstrate ineffective
assistance of counsel. That argument of the petitioner is summarily dismissed.
The issue raise on appeal was not whether the petitioner committed a theft. The
evidence before the trial court on that point was overwhelming. The appeal was filed to see if
the evidence was sufficient to support the burglary conviction and the resulting consecutive
sentences. Mr. Holm did not concede that issue before the Court of Appeals. Indeed, his
statement was an attempt to frame the issue being raised on appeal. It would have been folly
for Mr. Holm to attempt to argue that the evidence before the trial court did not support the
conviction for theft, especially since his own client had admitted the theft at the trial.

QRPER FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARJNQ
The case is ordered set for an evidentiary hearing on the remaining issues. The hearing
shall be limited to evidence on:
1. Mr. Holm's decision not to interview Detective Orton or call him as a witness at the
trial; and
2. Mr. Holm's decision not to introduce photographs of the Deseret Industries store at
trial.
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The matter is set for a scheduling conference in which both the petitioner and the
attorney representing the State of Utah are to participate by telephone. The clerk will calendar
the hearing and send notice to the parties of the time and date. During that conference the
court will address the witnesses to be called, the exhibits to be introduced and the timing of the
hearing. In addition, the court will discuss transportation concerns so that the petitioner can be
present at the hearing.
Since the petitioner is incarcerated, the court hereby orders that the Office of the Utah
Attorney General is to set up the telephonic scheduling conference and to arrange for Mr.
Glasper's participation, and then connect the court at the appointed hour. Any arrangements
concerning the scheduling conference can be coordinated with the court by calling Maxine at
(435)477-8695.
DATED this 20th day of January 2000.

J. PHILIP EVES, D^trict Court Judge
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Certificate of Mailing
I hereby certify that on this 21st day of January 2000,1 mailed true and correct copies
of the above and foregoing document, first-class postage prepaid, to the following:
Roy Lee Glasper, K90014
CSP Solano
P.O. Box 4000-23-B-2U
Vacaville, CA 95695-4000
Erin Riley, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
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Addendum H

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROY LEE GLASPER,

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Petitioner,

vs.

CASE NO. 990500385 WR
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STATE OF UTAH,
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This matter came before the court for an evidentiary hearing. Mr. Glaspef^ili> pltsciiu •
representing himself. The State of Utah was represented by Erin Riley of the Utah Attorney
General's Office. The court heard argument and evidence. The court now enters the
following findings, conclusions and ruling.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In January, 1997, the petitioner and his cousin were arrested in Cedar City, Utah and
charged with criminal acts. The petitioner was originally charged with burglary, theft and
receiving stolen property. The case was investigated by the Cedar City Police Department and
written statements were taken from the witnesses. The follow up investigation by the police
department was under the direction of Detective Kelvin Orton.
The Iron County Attorney's Office was given the reports and information compiled by
the police and filed formal charges against the petitioner. A preliminary hearing was held and
the petitioner was bound over to the district court on all three charges pending against him.
The petitioner entered a plea of not guilty and the matter was set for trial by a jury.

On the day of the jury trial, the petitioner elected to waive his right to a jury. The case
was tried to the court after the State moved to dismiss the receiving stolen property charge. At
the start of the trial, the petitioner admitted that he committed the crime of theft, as alleged in
the Information, except that he reserved the issue of the amount of money taken.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the court found that the petitioner had committed
theft by taking a money bag containing currency from the desk in the office at the rear of the
Deseret Industries Store and fixed the amount of money taken in the Third Degree Felony
range. The court also found that the petitioner had committed burglary by entering the
enclosed office for the purpose of committing the theft. The petitioner was committed to the
state prison.
Throughout the preliminary hearing and trial proceedings, the petitioner was
represented by Mr. Floyd W. Holm as counsel for the indigent. Mr. Holm was, at the time,
an experienced trial attorney, having tried about 20 jury trials and over a hundred day long
court trials. Following the sentencing in this matter, the petitioner hired private counsel for a
brief period and filed notice of appeal. He then requested appointed counsel and Mr. Holm
was reappointed to represent him during the appeal, and did so.
On September 11, 1998, the Utah Court of Appeals issued a Memorandum Decision
affirming the petitioner's conviction of both charges and upholding the sentence imposed.
On June 21, 1999, the petitioner filed in this court his Application For Writ Of Habeas
Corpus. At the time he was housed in the California State Prison System having been
transferred there by the Board of Pardons.
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On June 30, 1999, this court issued a Memorandum Decision pursuant to Rule 65C,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in which some of the issues raised by petitioner were summarily
dismissed for the reasons stated in that Memorandum Decision. The remaining issue on the
Application which survived summary dismissal was the claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel which the petitioner raised for the first time since the trial, so far as the court was able
to determine. Accordingly the Attorney General was served with the Application and
responded with a Motion To Dismiss on the grounds that the respondent named in the
Application was actually an official of the California Penal System and that the respondent
should be the detaining authorities in the State of Utah.
In response, the petitioner filed an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
naming the State of Utah as respondent. The Attorney General's Office then filed a Motion
For Clarification.
On September 8, 1999, the court issued its Order ruling on the pending Motions. The
matter was set for an evidentiary hearing on the petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of
trial and appellate counsel.
Thereafter, in response to motions from the petitioner, the court issued yet another
Memorandum Opinion on January 21, 2000, in which the court delineated the two claims
raised by the petitioner upon which the court would received evidence at the hearing:
1. Mr. Holm's decision not to interview Detective Orton or call him as a witness at the
trial, and
2. Mr. Holm's decision not to introduce photographs of the Deseret Industries store at
the trial.
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It was that evidentiary hearing that occurred on May 9, 2000.

FINDINGS OF FACT
At the hearing the petitioner attempted to present testimony from witnesses about other
alleged deficiencies in Mr. Holm's trial performance. However, since those deficiencies were
not raised by the petitioner in his Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, the court
declined to hear that evidence.
The court finds that Mr. Holm did not interview Detective Orton in preparation for the
trial, although he may have questioned him at the time of the preliminary hearing. The court
finds further that Mr. Holm did not interview the witnesses from the crime scene, except to
question them during their testimony at the preliminary hearing. The court finds further that
Mr. Holm did not call Detective Orton as a witness for the defense at the trial.
Regarding the introduction of photographs at the trial, the court finds that no one on
either side of the case took any photographs of the interior of the Deseret Industries Store to
show the layout of the store for trial. The Deseret Industries Store is a commercial
establishment open to the public and familiar to Mr. Holm. Mr. Holm determined that a
diagram drawn by the store manager would suffice to illustrate to the court the issues presented
in the case. Such a diagram was made during the trial at Mr. Holm's request, marked as an
exhibit and introduced in evidence. The court had reference to the diagram at all times during
the testimony of the employees from Deseret Industries and the petitioner.
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT TRIAL
The petitioner has the burden of proving his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
4

pursuant to the two prong test enunciated in the U.S. Supreme Court case entitled Strickland v
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
"{10} The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
the assistance of counsel to defendants in all criminal prosecutions. This right has
been interpreted as "the right to effective assistance of counsel." McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763, 90 S. Ct. 1441 (1970).
The test for determining when a defendant has been denied this right is set forth in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
Strickland establishes a two-part test: First, the defendant must show that counsel's
performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as
to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a
defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence
resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.
The petitioner must first show that the performance of his attorney was deficient when
compared to the expected performance for trial counsel and that the deficiencies were
prejudicial to the petitioner's case." fState v. Finlavson. 386 UAR 57 (Utah 2000)]

Detective Orton
The petitioner argues that his counsel should have called Detective Orton as a witness at
the trial. Although it might have been more appropriate for Mr. Holm to have interviewed
Detective Orton prior to the trial, it is clear from the testimony of Detective Orton which was
received at the hearing on May 9, 2000, that Detective Orton's testimony would not have been
helpful to the petitioner. Detective Orton's testimony demonstrates that he does not possess
any evidence contrary to the statements of the witnesses about the location of the money bag
before the petitioner admittedly took it. The detective does not have useful impeachment
information to attack the credibility of the Deseret Industries employees.
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Petitioner has failed to demonstrate how his defense counsel erred by failing to call
Detective Orton. Rather, the defense attorney, Mr. Holm, testified that he expected that
Detective Orton's testimony, if presented at trial, would acaially have the effect of buttressing
the statements of the State's witnesses to the detriment of the petitioner, as it would have
shown that they were consistent in their statements about the location of the money bag.
Mr. Holm also testified that he could not have called Detective Orton to testify as to
hearsay statements of the witnesses, because the statements given to him were consistent with
the statements the witnesses gave at the trial.
Additionally, even if Mr. Holm erred in not calling Detective Orton as a witness, the
petitioner has failed to demonstrate that his defense was prejudiced by that error. The trial in
this case came down to a simple question: Did Mr. Glasper take the money bag from the cash
register counter in the public part of the store or did he take the money bag from the enclosed
office in the back of the store where he had no right to go?
Mr. Golds worthy's testimony was unequivocal that the money bag was left on the top
of the desk in the back office of the store when he went out on the sales floor to tell Mr.
Glasper's niece that the store was closed. That testimony was buttressed, at least in part, by
the testimony of Ms. Stover, who testified that as she was coming up to the sales floor area
from a downstairs portion of the store, she saw the petitioner moving stealthily through the
clothes racks on the sales floor and coming from the direction of the office. She observed that
he had the store's money bag in his hand and saw him conceal it in his pants. She went
immediately to Mr. Golds worthy, who was standing near the cash register counter, and
reported her observations.
6

These statements were apparently consistent with the testimony and statements ot these
two witnesses from the very beginning of this case.
On the other hand, Mr. Giasper testified that he did not enter the office at the rear of
the store, but that he found the money bag lying on the cash register counter, picked it up and
left the store with it. His version of the theft was in clear contradiction to the version given by
the Deseret Industries employees. The court considered the possible motives of the witnesses
to fabricate their testimony and chose to believe the employees, rather that Mr. Giasper.
Petitioner has failed to show that Detective Orton had any helpful information to
contribute at the trial which would have cast a different light on the assessment of the facts
made by the court.

Photographs
Petitioner argues that his trial counsel should have taken pictures of the Deseret
Industries Store and introduced them at trial, rather than to rely on a diagram of the store. The
court finds that petitioner has failed to demonstrate that his counsel erred in not taking such
photos or in relying on the diagram drawn by the witness.
Mr. Holm testified that he did not think that photographs were necessary

In tact,

during his testimony Mr. Holm opined that unless he could get a photograph that showed the
Deseret Industries building from the air without its roof, the diagram was the only way to show
the court the relative positions of the office, the cash register counter, the front door, the stair
case from downstairs and the witnesses at any given time.
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Even if there was some error attributable to Mr. Holm for failing to take and submit
photos, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate any prejudice to his case from the lack of
photographs. The issue at trial was whether the court would believe the statements of the
Deseret Industries employees or the statements of Mr. Glasper, who had admitted being a
thief. The court chose, in its discretion, to believe the employees. Photographs would not
have helped to change that exercise of discretion by the court.
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL ON APPEAL
The petitioner has presented no evidence supporting his claim that he was rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal. He argues, without any evidentiary support, that at
one time during his representation by Mr. Holm, he expressed dissatisfaction with the handling
of the trial. However, Mr. Holm has no recollection of any such conversation. Since the
petitioner did not testify at the May 9, 2000 hearing, there is no evidence supporting
petitioner's assertions.
Mr. Holm testified that he was never told that the petitioner was unhappy with his
work, and consequently never told the court that Mr. Glasper was unhappy with his work,
because he was not aware that Mr. Glasper felt that way. He stated that if he had known that
Mr. Glasper was not happy with his work, he would have immediately sought permission to
withdraw from the case and to have another attorney appointed to represent Mr. Glasper.
The court finds that there is no evidence that the appeal in this matter was mishandled
by Mr. Holm, or that his work on that appeal was prejudicial to petitioner.
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Accordingly, the Petition of the petitioner is denied in its entirety, and this application
is dismissed.
DATED this 11th day of May 2000.

0-

J. PHILIP EVES, BKstrict Court Judge
, QKstric
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Certificate of Mailing
I hereby cenify that on this 11th day of May 2000, I mailed true and co
ve and foregoing document, first-class postage prepaid, to the following
Roy Lee Glasper
Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, UT 84020
Erin Riley, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6lh Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854

Maxine Munson, Deputy Clerk
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